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CONSTITUTIONS AND BLOCKCHAINS: COMPETITIVE 







In the context of private ordering—where rule sets are relatively fluid, centrally 
controlled, and exist in the shadow of law and regulation—developing 
generalizable insights about comparatively superior governance mechanisms is 
difficult. I shed light on this question by characterizing cryptocurrency blockchains 
as a type of constitutional rule set that both defines and legitimizes the activities 
supported by the underlying distributed ledger technology. More specifically, I 
argue that cryptocurrency blockchains have led to new forms of competition in 
private governance, which include exit costs and citizenship rules as important 
competitive margins. My analysis not only identifies the choices in constitutional 
governance to which proposed cryptocurrency blockchain changes are analogous, 
but it also highlights the competitive gains expected to result from these changes. I 
further consider both the trade-offs in governance created by competition between 
cryptocurrency blockchains and the surprising ways in which these unique 
competitive margins may influence downstream outcomes.
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Constitutions are the most famous example of what legal scholars refer to 
as secondary rules. More colloquially, secondary rules are the rules about making 
rules.1 
 
In the case of constitutions, these rule sets determine how laws are enacted, 
administered, and adjudicated in a given society. Constitutional rules are thus 
accorded a high level of importance in a given nation’s legal system because they 
are quite literally the foundation upon which all subsequent legislation and 
government action rest. Because of constitutional rules’ fundamental nature, these 
rules are by design less subject to change than ordinary legislation. In other words, 
constitutional rules are typically the most rigid rule set in a given legal system. 
Nonetheless, constitutions vary as to the means and ease by which they can be 
amended. Thus, the comparative flexibility of a given constitution is an institutional 
design choice that has long been treated in the scholarship on comparative 
constitutional design, which has linked flexibility both to endurance and to a 
diminished need for informal measures of constitutional adjustment.  
 
Where there is a distinct understanding of the fundamental rules governing 
human interactions—perhaps because of the lack of a uniform standard of 
comparison and public availability of underlying policies—is in the context of 
private governance. This may be in part because one of the benefits of a firm 
structure is that decisions regarding policy change are typically validated through a 
centralized process, as opposed to a democratic one, which inherently creates less 
need for “governance of governance” in that the “law” is whatever the central firm 
authority says it is. From an economic perspective, the firm provides the 
quintessential example of private governance. Previous scholars such as Coase and 
Williamson have demonstrated how governance within the firm is an essential field 
of study for understanding economic outcomes.2 The ubiquity of the firm as an 
organizational structure governing economic production has a corollary 
implication: the choice of private institutions by various firms provides a margin 
for competition. However, the extent to which firms can freely compete in terms of 
internal governance and the agreements struck with different employees and 
suppliers is an open question in a world of increased legislation and regulation of 
contractual agreements, especially in the case of publicly-traded companies.  
                                                             
1 See generally Lɪᴏɴᴇʟ Aᴅᴏʟᴘʜᴜꜱ Hᴀʀᴛ & Lᴇꜱʟɪᴇ Gʀᴇᴇɴ, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2012). 
2 See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386–405 (1937); Oliver E. Williamson, 
The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract, 16 JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 172–95 (2002).  






 In a world of regulated and centralized firms, how do scholars derive 
insights about the comparative benefits of different choices in private governance? 
The emergence of blockchains as the technology underlying cryptocurrencies 
provides a fruitful context in which to examine this question. The example of the 
different tensions faced by Ether and Bitcoin, and the different responses in terms 
of changes to the fundamental underlying structure of the blockchains supporting 
the two cryptocurrencies, suggests value in comparing how different mechanisms 
of blockchain governance result in different outcomes for cryptocurrencies and 
their intended functions. Using insights from constitutional design generally, and 
amendment processes specifically, I explore the differences in blockchain 
governance mechanisms in this article. I conclude that blockchains can be 
understood as a type of constitutional rule set that both defines and legitimizes the 
activities supported by permissionless distributed ledger technology.3 In particular, 
the exit costs and amendment processes defined by the “constitutional” regimes 
that blockchains define create a unique competitive margin that will shape the 
comparative success of a given cryptocurrency. 
 
I proceed by first reviewing the existing scholarship on constitutional 
processes and by identifying how ubiquitous constitutional design features 
(amendment rules, rule entrenchment, and citizenship provisions) can each play a 
role in facilitating the objectives of those engaged in a rule-based collective 
decision-making process like those governed by permissionless blockchains. I then 
provide a brief description of the blockchains supporting major cryptocurrencies, 
identifying the ways in which the underlying network rules are similar to and 
distinct from constitutional rules. Next, I compare existing and proposed 
governance structures for blockchains, especially those supporting the 
cryptocurrencies Bitcoin and Ether, but also other permissionless use cases. My 
analysis identifies not only the choices in constitutional governance to which 
proposed blockchain changes are analogous but also the competitive benefits and 
costs that result, with a view to the intended functions of a given blockchain. 
Finally, I consider the trade-offs in governance that competition between 
cryptocurrency blockchains creates, examining how these unique competitive 
margins can influence downstream outcomes, and predicting that membership 
rules, rule entrenchment, and amendment processes will become increasingly 
salient governance choices.  
                                                             
3 Other scholars have contemporaneously drawn related comparisons to mine. See, e.g., Shruti 
Rajagopalan, Blockchain & Buchanan: Code As Constitution (2019) (in James Buchanan, Theorist 
of Political Economy and Social Philosophy, (Palgrave MacMillan 2019); see also Alastair Berg, 
Chis Novak, & Mikayla Novak, Blockchains and Constitutional Catallaxy (Dec. 4, 2018), available 
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295477 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3295477. 





II. CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: RULE ENTRENCHMENT, CITIZENSHIP, AND 
AMENDMENT 
The principal bulk of our behavior is not governed directly by constitutional 
rules. Instead, our behavior is governed by the legislative, executive, and judicial 
output of public organizations defined by these constitutional rules. It is in this 
sense that “the rules about making rules” are secondary, as Hart described them.4 
Our primary day-to-day activities and the majority of our disputes and prohibited 
actions are governed by primary rules; secondary rules instead define the system 
that writes, administers, and adjudicates the primary rules governing our behavior. 
This is because there are significant benefits to agreeing to the means by which 
subsequent rules will be defined and changed. If, instead, every rule change also 
required a debate over the means by which the rule would be defined, creating new 
rules would be much harder, if not impossible.5 Put differently, the game cannot be 
played if no one agrees on the underlying rules. This is the essential argument for 
the ubiquitous emergence of constitutional rule sets in governance systems around 
the world.6 Within these rule sets, though, there are also more specific constitutional 
design features that reduce the costs of collective decision making at scale: rule 
entrenchment, citizenship (or membership) rules, and amendment processes. Both 
the multi-tiered nature of constitutional rules more generally, as well as these design 
features more specifically, share intended functions with blockchains that reveal 
important governance tradeoffs for different cryptocurrency communities. 
 
A. Rule Entrenchment 
The first ubiquitous constitutional design feature is that of rule 
entrenchment, or insulation. The reasons for the entrenchment of rules follow 
directly from the logic of secondary rules more generally. Leaving decision rules 
up for grabs can greatly stymy group decision making due to the increased costs 
and strategic incentives already discussed. Even if a rule is not given heightened 
protection from change as compared to the ordinary decision rules in a given group, 
decision-making procedures tend to limit a given meeting to a known set of topics, 
                                                             
4 See Hᴀʀᴛ & Gʀᴇᴇɴ, supra note 1.  
5 A multi-tiered rule process focuses the margins of political competition on a more narrow set of 
issues, once the rules of the game have been agreed upon. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan, The 
Relatively Absolute Absolutes, in THE LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 448–
50 (Liberty Fund, 1999); see also Jonathan Riley, Constitutional Democracy as a Two-Stage Game, 
in CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRATIC RULE 147–50 (Cambridge University Press, 
2001). 
6 See Jᴀᴍᴇꜱ M. Bᴜᴄʜᴀɴᴀɴ & Gᴏʀᴅᴏɴ Tᴜʟʟᴏᴄᴋ, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 60–80 (University of 
Michigan Press, 1962) (discussing why constitutional rule sets could emerge as the result of purely 
self-interested decisions among constituents). 





in part to prevent the decision rules from being subject to opportunistic change.7 
However, this specific procedural rule, limiting group decisions to the matters 
defined ex-ante,  raises a more general design question surrounding secondary 
rules: which rules have to be defined before ordinary decision-making can proceed? 
This begets the notion that some rules are properly constitutional. The rules about 
making rules have to be defined before decisions about ordinary rules can be made. 
However, secondary rules also necessarily empower and constrain the individuals 
who make decisions on behalf of the group to ensure that decision-making follows 
a known and defined process. 
 
The fact that the secondary rules both define and constrain the individuals 
uniquely empowered as compared to ordinary group members has led to the 
additional institutional design choice that is nearly ubiquitous in these contexts: 
insulation of secondary rules from the ordinary processes of collective decision-
making.8 In practice, this typically takes two forms. First, changes to secondary 
rules typically require a higher degree of consensus among group decision-makers 
as compared to changes to ordinary rules. The canonical example of this in practice 
is the requirement in political systems that constitutional amendments require a 
legislative supermajority to occur.9 The second form of rule entrenchment, is the 
involvement of a larger portion of the group, or a distinct subset of group members, 
in such decisions.10 Clear examples of rule entrenchment from constitutional design 
worldwide are the involvement of subnational units in constitutional amendments 
                                                             
7 See John W. Patty & Elizabeth Maggie Penn, The Legislative Calendar, 48 MATHEMATICAL AND 
COMPUTER MODELLING 1590–91,1599–1600 (2008) (discussing the necessity of a general 
understanding of legislative schedule setting, given its ubiquity in practice). 
8 Options in practice of more less stringent amendment rules abound. If occurring via legislative 
change, adjustment of the threshold required for passage is a common choice, with a higher 
threshold accordingly making passage more difficult, and vice versa. Another margin defining the 
difficulty of amendment involves the extent to which different stakeholders’ input is required in 
order for amendment to occur; if an amendment can only occur after it has successfully passed the 
legislative threshold and a popular referendum, this is more difficult than requiring either one of 
those options. See Bjørn Erik Rasch & Roger D. Congleton, Amendment Procedures and 
Constitutional Stability, 12 DEM. CONST. DESIGN & PUB. POL’Y: ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE 536–49 
(2006) (discussing options in practice of less stringent amendment rules abound. If occurring via 
legislative change, adjustment of the threshold required for passage is a common choice, with a 
higher threshold accordingly making passage more difficult, and vice versa. Another margin 
defining the difficulty of amendment involves the extent to which different stakeholders’ input is 
required in order for amendment to occur; if an amendment can only occur after it has successfully 
passed the legislative threshold and a popular referendum, this is more difficult than requiring either 
one of those options). 
9 See Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? 
Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty,13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
691 (2015). 
10 See id. at 692. 





(like the role of states governments in the United States)11 or the requirement that 
proposed constitutional amendments pass a public referendum before enactment.12 
The formal articulation of core group principles and beliefs also frequently receive 
this level of entrenchment,13 even if the entrenchment of these principles is not 
strictly necessary from the functional perspective of ordinary group decision-
making. 
 
Instead of the inadequacy of a given constitution eventually leading to it 
being overturned and replaced, a lower cost outcome is the adjustment of the 
constitution to prevent outright constitutional rupture.14 This makes the exact level 
of rule entrenchment an important constitutional design question.15 Because of the 
relative entrenchment of constitutional rules compared to ordinary legislation, 
changing them in practice tends to provide an expressive function in signaling that 
a cornerstone aspect of governance is subject to potential change.16 Meaning, the 
very act of amending a constitution raises the salience of the particular areas in 
question (as well as inflaming “constitutional passions,” independent of the 
underlying political or social questions at issue).17 The ability to amend a 
fundamental charter also provides for dynamic legitimization; if those currently 
governed by a given constitution can change it, then they are more likely to view 
the constitution as reflecting their needs and goals surrounding governance. This 
concept of the ongoing “fit” between the written constitutional document and 
societal preferences surrounding governance is one that comes up against the 
strength of governance preferences today, versus the need for the intertemporal 
ability to adjust this fit. Which aspects, if any, of the constitution should be 
insulated to the point that they are never subject to future adjustment? 
                                                             
11 See Rasch & Congleton, supra note 8, at 326. 
12 See Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 9, at 692. 
13 See Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the Rise of World 
Constitutionalism, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 597, 601 (2000). 
14 See generally Richard Albert, The Expressive Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 59 
MCGILL L.J. 225 (2013) (discussing the corrective nature of constitutional amendment procedures 
and safeguards those procedures provide); see also SANFORD LEVINSON, RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson 
ed., 1995). 
15 Despite many similar and identical amendment processes around the world, there is significant 
variation in the extent of change that a given level of constitutional flexibility yields in practice. 
This suggests that rule entrenchment, like many constitutional design questions, interacts in complex 
ways with the political and social milieu within which it is enacted and implemented. See Ginsburg 
& Melton, supra note 9, at 692–701. 
16 See Rasch & Congleton, supra note 8, at 325–26. 
17 Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in Constitutional Design, 9 
INT’L J. CON. L. 636, 636–72 (2011) (examining how different constitutional amendments and 
methods of amending are impacted by various social and political considerations). 






The distinction between adherence to the letter of constitutional law, and 
adherence to the ongoing societal governance beliefs that animated the creation of 
the constitutional order writ large, has been well studied by constitutional scholars. 
Put simply, constituents in general, and political actors in particular, are guided by 
their beliefs as to what the constitution should (and should not) achieve.18 Just as 
sufficiently reprehensible government action itself can trigger regime change, 
sufficient change to the constitutional definition of governments (and its checks and 
balances) has long been argued as capable of annihilating or eliminating the 
existing constitutional order altogether.19 The justification for making some 
provisions unamendable clearly spells out the distinction between the unwritten 
constitutional principles that are crystallized through a constituent process into the 
written constitution: “the immutability of the principles . . . marked out a normative 
core that defined the constitutional identity of the polity.”20 Unamendability, as the 
most extreme form of rule entrenchment, thus serves a profound expressive 
function, albeit one that is fundamentally anti-democratic intertemporally in the 
case of public constitutional orders.  
 
Although unamendability provides a clear link between the formal 
constitution itself and the constitutional principles animating the creation of the 
written document, the existence of an underlying set of constitutional beliefs is not 
limited to contexts where a subset of fundamental rules are unamendable per se. 
Fundamental beliefs about blockchains’ immutability and the need to punish bad 
actors stand as examples of these constitutional beliefs in the context of 
cryptocurrency communities, as the discussion in section V emphasizes.  
 
Constitutional rulesets’ supremacy has an important corollary: exiting a 
national constitution’s ruleset, or in other words, revoking one’s own citizenship, 
                                                             
18 See NORMAN SCHOFIELD, ARCHITECTS OF POLITICAL CHANGE: CONSTITUTIONAL QUANDARIES 
AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 260–62 (Stephen Ansolabehere ed., 2006); see generally Eric Alston, 
Lee Alston, & Bernardo Mueller, INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS & 
APPLICATIONS 273–313 (2018). 
19 Carl Schmitt’s 1928 critique of the paradox created by substantively unconstrained amendment 
procedures has been linked to the emergence of unamendable provisions in the German Basic Law 
of 1949. See CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 150–51 (Jeffery Seitzer ed. & trans., Duke 
University Press 2008); e.g., Ulrich K. Preuss, The Implications of Eternity Clauses: The German 
Experience, 44 ISR. L. REV. 439, 439 (2011). (explaining that the emergence of the Nazi regime that 
was so at odds with the core constitutional principles that gave birth to the Weimar Republic, led 
drafters of the Basic Law after World War II to adopt specific provisions that the fundamental 
aspects of the structure of the government could not be altered through the government’s power, 
effectively getting rid of a constitutional basis for amending these elements and requiring the 
wholesale replacement of Basic Law by Germans through extra-constitutional means).  
20 Preuss, supra note 19, at 441. 





often imposes significant costs. Moving from state to state can allow a citizen 
considerable choice as to the rules governing their behavior; the rules of the United 
States Constitution, however, do not change from state to state. The higher the exit 
costs, the more important the process of dynamic constitutional legitimization 
discussed thus far becomes, and vice versa, because, without a viable ability to 
change the rulesets that govern one’s life, the only alternative is to exit the ruleset.21 
Amendment rules at least partially address this problem and create a space within 
which the constitution can be changed. Constitutional amendment procedures can 
range from the extreme of making the constitution unamendable to making 
constitutional change subject to the same requirements as ordinary legislation. At 
the extreme of unamendability, constituents would have considerable certainty as 
to the finality of constitutional rules governing them at any given time, while at the 
other, constituents could easily adapt the constitution to suit new circumstances and 
changing beliefs surrounding governance.22 In practice, modern national 
constitutions strike a balance between these two extremes. Even if the drafters 
intend to lean towards unamendability, one scholar notes that the need for 
constitutional amendment is so fundamental that “all constitutions admit the 
possibility of amendment,”23 in great part because the option of exit is so costly for 
most individuals governed by a given constitution. For most citizens of nation-
states around the world, they are a member of a given constitutional order not by 
choice, but by the consequence of birth.  
 
B. Citizenship Rules (Exit & Entry Costs) 
Another key design feature in order for a secondary rule set to function in 
governing a given group is that of membership: what characteristics define who is 
a member of the group, and how can members leave the group (whether voluntarily 
or not)? In practice, these requirements can take the form of costs imposed upon 
joining or leaving the group: entry and exit costs. Entry costs are probably the most 
familiar to political theorists in the form of citizenship requirements: what 
conditions must be satisfied in order for a given individual to be able to participate 
                                                             
21 Exit costs have long been identified as a central determinant of the institutions of governance that 
emerge in both public and private organizations. See Aʟʙᴇʀᴛ Hɪʀꜱᴄʜᴍᴀɴ, EXIT VOICE AND 
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4–7 (1970). These costs 
have also been identified as important determinants of governance outcomes in the private sector; 
see, e.g., Colin Mayer, Corporate Governance and Performance, 21(1) J. L & SOC’Y. 152, 156 
(1997); John Coffee Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions: Why Exit 
Works Better Than Voice, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 409–10 (2008). 
22 Sanford V. Levinson, Designing an Amendment Process, in Cᴏɴꜱᴛɪᴛᴜᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Cᴜʟᴛᴜʀᴇ ᴀɴᴅ 
Dᴇᴍᴏᴄʀᴀᴛɪᴄ Rᴜʟᴇ 271, 272–274 (2001). 
23 Andrew Roberts, The Politics of Constitutional Amendment in Postcommunist Europe, 20 CONST. 
POL. ECON. 99, 99 (2009) (emphasis mine). 





in a political system with the standard rights and duties accorded to all other 
citizens?24 Entry requirements can be a screen for well-justified as well as dubious 
reasons: conditioning membership in a homeowners’ association on actual 
homeownership verges on the tautological, whereas conditioning such membership 
on race or ethnicity would rightly be broadly condemned in society today. Entry 
costs can, therefore, be conditioned on reasons related to the good of the 
organization itself, or for reasons unrelated to the strength or sustainability of the 
organization.  
 
Conditioning membership on a certain level of commitment or 
characteristics can shape membership or members’ incentives in ways that improve 
governance outcomes. If the costs are high enough to become a member, other 
members can receive more assurance as to the level of desire for membership on 
the part of new members. If one has made a costly investment in membership, one’s 
incentives to influence governance outcomes for the better are likely stronger than 
in the case of a group that it costs nothing to join.  
 
Just as becoming a member of the organization can be more or less costly 
to a given individual, so too can departing from the organization. For instance, taxes 
imposed on Americans revoking their U.S. citizenship are, in part, an attempt to 
condition the departure costs of high wealth citizens who may be incentivized to 
relinquish citizenship in search of a cheaper tax burden elsewhere.25 The extended 
process associated with changing citizenship also temporally delimits the ability of 
individuals to exit – one can effectively only change citizenship after a considerable 
amount of time has passed. The functional effect of such financial and temporal 
exit costs is that, by making exit more costly, an organization’s members are more 
likely to engage in the costly process of governance. If a given “citizen” can’t leave, 
they might as well influence the rules that will govern them. Currently, 
cryptocurrency community members face relatively low entry and exit costs, 
something that will likely change as cryptocurrency blockchains continue to 




                                                             
24 See Kim Rubenstein & Niamh Lenagh-Maguire, Citizenship and the Boundaries of the 
Constitution, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 143, 143 (2011); see also Patrick Weil, 
Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY: 
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 17, 17 (2001). 
25 See William Thomas Worster, The Constitutionality of the Taxation Consequences for 
Renouncing U.S. Citizenship, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 921, 923 (2010). 





C. Amendment Rules 
Ultimately, though, these specific constitutional design questions interact 
with one another in deep structural ways. The membership trade-offs influenced by 
entry and exit costs are also shaped by the choice of amendment rules: a constitution 
can be comparatively more flexible or rigid, depending upon how difficult it is to 
amend, which is itself a question of the extent of rule entrenchment originally 
chosen by constitutional drafters.26 Amendment rules have been characterized as 
necessarily corrective, recognizing the likelihood that a constitution will prove 
deficient in the light of unforeseen future events. Ultimately, though, the need for 
constitutional change is a function of how well initial constitutional design choices 
dynamically facilitate economies of scale in governance while simultaneously 
minimizing agency costs. 
 
Beyond the most basic structural trade-off between flexibility and rigidity, 
constitutional scholars have deepened the comparative understanding of choices of 
amendment rules. Thus, the trade-off between flexibility and rigidity has also been 
characterized as trading off between stability and flexibility;27 but this 
characterization of stability is more focused on the stability of the underlying rule 
set,28 as opposed to the stability of governance overall. The underlying intuition is 
a simple one: a constitution that faces more barriers to adjustment is less likely to 
be adaptable to changing circumstances in society, and hence, is more likely to 
provoke the need for a wholesale constitutional overhaul in cases where it does not 
fit the needs and beliefs surrounding governance in society. Nonetheless, too much 
flexibility at some level undermines the basic principle of constitutionalism as a set 
of stable limits on ordinary politics.29 Because of the complexity of these trade-
                                                             
26 In addition to the options for rule entrenchment discussed in a preceding subsection, other 
mechanisms for making a constitution more rigid or flexible exist in practice. Amendments can 
require more than one successful passage, a requirement designed to increase the salience of the 
issue to any stakeholders who might favor or oppose the amendment. The assent of subsidiary 
authorities can also be required, as is the case with the United States; Article V of the US 
Constitution requires the assent of two-thirds of the states to ratify any proposed changes to the 
constitution. See Sanford Levinson, RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, 110–134 (1995). Finally, separable amendment thresholds can be 
used to identify areas of the constitution subject to higher barriers to amendment, up to and including 
making certain aspects of the constitution unamendable altogether. See Albert, supra note 14, at 
247–51. 
27 Nathalie Behnke & Arthur Benz, The Politics of Constitutional Change Between Reform and 
Evolution, 39 J. FEDERALISM 213, 213 (2009). 
28 For example, the comparative flexibility of constitutions has been linked to increases in 
constitutional endurance. See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, & James Melton, THE ENDURANCE 
OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (2009). 
29 However, the nature of constitutional jurisprudence provides an additional outlet by which 
constitutional change can occur: instead of amending the constitution, changing judicial 





offs, constitutional scholars have focused on identifiable effects  from different 
amendment procedures,30 in addition to the rate of change that more or fewer 
barriers to amendment imply.31  
 
A broader characterization of the institutional design trade-offs implicit to 
the choice of amendment rules surrounds the need for a constitution to adapt to new 
developments while entrenching the system from self-interested behavior,32 at 
some point, amendment rules that are too flexible would mean none of the rules of 
the game are insulated from political pressures.33 The need for constitutional 
change has also been linked to political change and the dysfunctional performance 
of the existing constitutional regime.34 Each of these insights displays the fact that 
amendment procedures (and the frequency of amendment the procedures create) 
exist in a complex dynamic with the ongoing operation of the political system in 
both prior and subsequent periods. This is no different in the case of blockchains—
the rules for changing the underlying fundamental rule set are implicated in 
complex ways in the processes of governance and cryptocurrency output. In 
particular, constituents of blockchains face low exit costs, which provides an 
alternative to both enduring a rule set that is too rigid to change, as well as 
weathering changes of a greater frequency and magnitude than they would prefer.35 
                                                             
interpretations of constitutional requirements can adjust the constitution to reflect changing social 
conditions. See id.  
30 One such trade-off focuses on the extent to which the constitution includes high levels of detail 
as creating less need for downstream judicial interpretation. See Albert, supra note 14. Depending 
on the rigidity of the amendment rule, judicial interpretation may achieve a high level of finality. In 
the United States, for example, only four Supreme Court rulings had been reversed by constitutional 
amendment by 1988. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS 
POLITICAL PROCESS 201 (Princeton University Press, 1988). 
31 This insight has been developed empirically, for several scholars have linked the length and detail 
of constitution to the frequency of amendment. See, e.g., Gabriel Negretto, Replacing and Amending 
Constitutions: The Logic of Constitutional Change in Latin America, 46 Law & Soc’y Rev 749–79 
(2012); Elkins et al., supra note 28. 
32 See Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1584–626 (2010).  
33 A constitutional scholar who views constitutions as a bargain amongst powerful government 
actors (e.g., a legislature and a monarch or executive, typically) equates strengthening amendment 
rules with facilitating minority rights and the rule of law, emphasizing the role of stability as a 
crucial input to the rule of law. See Roger D. Congleton, PERFECTING PARLIAMENT: 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, LIBERALISM, AND THE RISE OF WESTERN DEMOCRACY 287 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
34 For example, the extent to which a given political system displays fragmentation of parties has 
been shown to interact with the nature of amendment procedures and the frequency. Gabriel 
Negretto, Replacing and Amending Constitutions: The Logic of Constitutional Change in Latin 
America, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV (2012); see also Negretto, supra note 31, and Schofield, supra note 
18. 
35 Frequency of changes to a given blockchain network’s rule set is already a margin defining distinct 
cryptocurrencies. Ethereum has changed its rules much more frequently than Bitcoin. See Primavera 






Furthermore, an important distinction exists in the literature between 
amending the constitution and amending the amendment procedures contained 
therein. A stable amendment procedure is a key measure of constitutional 
durability.36 Changes to the constitution are expected, but changes to the means by 
which the constitution can be changed signal a very different kind of change. This 
is related to the fact that amended rules have been characterized as directly 
expressing fundamental constitutional values.37 Similarly, amendment processes 
themselves can be understood as having a revelatory function, whereby the basis 
for the legitimacy of governance is revealed through both proposed and successful 
constitutional amendments.38 Changing the means of amendment is thus more of a 
meta-amendment, as compared to the more common changes to the underlying 
structure, and may indicate that such a change implicates much more fundamental 
changes to governance than other amendments.39 Different changes to 
cryptocurrency blockchains can be understood as implicating these concerns to 
very different degrees, as the discussion in section V emphasizes—some changes 
to blockchains are the equivalent of ordinary amendments, whereas others are the 
equivalent of changing amendment rules themselves. 
 
  Constitutional design writ large is seen as a trade-off between the 
economies of scale in governance that a single fundamental rule set creates and the 
agency costs associated with the necessarily representative government that 
governance at such a scale entails.40 One of the fundamental challenges in 
constitutional design is to restrain the lawmaking power once this power has been 
vested in representative agents who are only periodically and at best imperfectly 
disciplined by the constituents whose governance preferences their choices ideally 
represent.41 Of course, there is a dynamic element to these design choices, which 
implies that the fundamental ruleset should, to the extent possible, minimize future 
transaction costs associated with governance to reduce the need for costly 
constitutional change.42 The study of constitutions for the design of fundamental 
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36 Rasch & Congleton, supra note 8. 
37 See Albert, supra note 14.  
38 Richard Albert, Nonconstitutional Amendments, 22 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 5–47 (2009).  
39 Not all changes to amendment procedures are necessarily so fundamental; Sweden’s changes to 
its amendment procedures were a necessary consequence of reducing the number of chambers of 
the legislature, as opposed to being directly intended to significantly change the way the constitution 
could be changed in the future. See Congleton, supra note 33.  
40 Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 32, at 1594–97. 
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42 Rɪʟᴇʏ, supra note 5, at 163–67. 





rule sets concludes that these sets of rules trade off between facilitating governance 
at scale (as well as the underlying processes being governed)43 and creating 
principal-agent problems on the part of those individuals who directly take part in 
governance. In the case of permissionless blockchains, the network participants 
who process and validate cryptocurrency transactions are the equivalent of 
representative agents that are only constrained by the network rules and the choice 
of users to transact and store value in one cryptocurrency or another. I explain this 
analogy in detail in the following section. 
III. BLOCKCHAINS AND GOVERNANCE 
Blockchains are, at their most fundamental, a ledger distributed across 
numerous networked computers that share a known process for updating entries to 
the shared ledger. The blockchains supporting most major cryptocurrencies share 
two important definitional components: (i) changes to the underlying ledger update 
original entries in discrete blocks of information,44 as opposed to overwriting them; 
and (ii) these changes to the ledger occur via a decentralized process among 
participants on a particular blockchain network.45 The way in which decentralized 
updates to the common ledger occur is defined by the consensus algorithm put in 
place by a given blockchain. This consensus algorithm (the rules for determining 
how changes to the ledger occur) is part of the initial conditions that are coded into 
the architecture of the blockchain itself. In what is perhaps the most famous 
blockchain—that underlying Bitcoin— the consensus algorithm creates a race 
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ledger duplicated across numerous network nodes. Luke Fortney, Blockchain Explained, 
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example of this. All blockchains are a form of distributed ledger duplicated across numerous 
network nodes that can only be updated as opposed to amended, but only some blockchains are 
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among network nodes (“participants”)46 to solve a cryptographic hash function,47 a 
method that, while largely secure against fraudulent attempts to update the ledger 
to reflect Bitcoins that do not exist,48 is graphics processor-intensive and so 
consumes considerable amounts of energy.49 This particular consensus algorithm, 
known as proof-of-work (“PoW”), operates in a winner-take-all fashion—when one 
network participant has successfully solved the cryptographic puzzle, the rest of the 
nodes that were processing potential solutions to the hash function are effectively 
back to square one. From the perspective of these miners, the energy expended in 
processing network users’ transactions receives no reward until the next set of 
proposed changes to the Bitcoin ledger is accepted through the next successful 
participant’s resolution of the hash function.50 Because each network participant’s 
processor is engaged in an electrically costly race to solve the cryptographic puzzle, 
this method of achieving consensus over proposed changes to the network ledger 
is called “proof-of-work;” a successfully proposed block represents proof of energy 
expended to validate network transactions. To the layperson, this means processing 
transactions on the Bitcoin network is very electricity-intensive, and only more so 
as the value of Bitcoin increases and more participants compete to receive a fixed 
                                                             
46 Network nodes are often referred to as miners because their incentives to process transactions are 
created by a reward of new units of the cryptocurrency. Throughout this piece I will refer to the 
individuals in control of these nodes as network participants, because of their role in the production, 
processing, and verifying of cryptocurrency transactions. Individuals who use cryptocurrency to 
transact or store value are instead network users, because they play no direct role in the maintenance 
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47 A cryptographic hash function is basically a puzzle where network participants race to guess an 
unknown answer to a unique puzzle (typically a string of numbers or characters preceded by a given 
number of zeros when resolved by the hash function). The Ethereum blockchain currently relies on 
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by one entity, then the ledger can be updated to reflect transactions that would be at odds with 
network rules. This creates the possibility for double-spending Bitcoins. In practice, however, the 
major cryptocurrencies tend to have sufficient network participants to where a 51 percent attack is 
unlikely. See, e.g., Wᴇʀʙᴀᴄʜ, supra note 45, at 100. Less widely adopted cryptocurrencies (with 
accordingly lower numbers of network nodes) have suffered from 51 percent attacks, however. See 
Jordan French, Ethereum Classic’s “51% Attack,” $1 Million Loss, Raise Concerns About Security, 
THE STREET (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.thestreet.com/investing/bitcoin/attack-against-ethereum-
classic-14832327 [https://perma.cc/H2ME-75NQ]. 
49See generally Arvind Narayanan et. al., Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies: a 
Comprehensive Introduction (2016); see also Harald Vranke, Sustainability of Bitcoin and 
Blockchains, 28 CURRENT OPINION IN ENVTL. SUSTAINABILITY 1, 1–9 (2017). 
50 See Zibin Zheng et al., An Overview of Blockchain Technology: Architecture, Consensus, and 
Future Trends, 6 IEEE Int’l Cong. on Big Data 557, 560 (2017).  





amount of Bitcoins for each successful resolution of the hash function.51 Because 
anyone who has a sufficiently powerful computer, internet access, and electricity 
can become a network participant, this makes these types of blockchains 
permissionless, meaning no central authority controls who can make changes to the 
network ledger or participate in network governance. 
 
 What the choice of the PoW consensus algorithm has done for Bitcoin is to 
drive a wedge between its initially proposed dual functions as a store of value and 
a payment network. Bitcoin’s growing salience to potential adopters has made it an 
increasingly successful store of value (with the exception of the price volatility52 
associated with speculative interest and regulatory interventions in a variety of 
countries), but this increase in value has created problems for Bitcoin’s ability to 
serve as a competitive payment network, given the cost and time required to process 
a single transaction. This has led to considerable debate within the Bitcoin 
community itself surrounding how to overcome these problems that are a direct 
result of the initial choice of consensus algorithm.53 In the case of Bitcoin, changes 
to the rules governing the blockchain network’s processes occur through a fork in 
the blockchain itself,54 which is successful if a majority of other network nodes 
accept the new code as changed, as compared to the original code.55 This has led to 
difficulties in successfully changing the underlying architecture of the network. 
While this is not to say a given proposed fork in the Bitcoin blockchain should or 
should not have occurred, a wide variety of network participants have expressed 
frustration at the current means of changing the rules of the blockchain itself, which 
emphasizes the importance of blockchain governance.  
 
 The process described regarding the simultaneous processing and validation 
of a set of network transactions, coupled with the reward of new units of 
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cryptocurrency for doing so, creates a set of margins that together define the 
incentives of network participants. The margins of cryptocurrency reward amount, 
network fees,56 block size, and puzzle difficulty together to create an equilibrium 
expected payoff as a function of the energy expended by a given network 
participant to successfully resolve a set of proposed transactions on the network.57 
The greater the anticipated reward (increasing as puzzle difficulty decreases and 
rewards and fees increase), the greater the number of network participants likely to 
expend the energy in racing to solve the underlying hash function. Thus, one 
significant area of debate among network participants is how to calibrate these 
factors to the benefit of all participants. Of course, the nature of processing 
transactions is energy-intensive, which means energy prices greatly determine 
where network participants are physically located,58 as well as these participants’ 
relative positions with respect to proposed changes to the rules governing the 
blockchain. Importantly, though, a final definitional component of participants’ 
incentives is that of the costs of exit—to the extent that changes to their incentives 
on one blockchain are sufficiently undesirable, permissionless blockchain 
participants can (at some cost) opt into a different cryptocurrency blockchain that 
better matches their governance preferences. 
 
 This all suggests that even in the case of cryptocurrency networks, for which 
some of the comparative benefits depend in great part on the blockchain’s 
immutability, the governance of system-wide processes (often tightly tied to the 
consensus algorithm by which changes to the ledger occur) and the process by 
which the rules of this governance can change, have significant implications for the 
intended outputs of the network itself. Put differently, the rules about making or 
changing rules governing a blockchain matter fundamentally. This insight comes 
as no surprise to any legal or constitutional theorist, of course. In addition to the 
Bitcoin community, other cryptocurrency blockchains (e.g., Ethereum) are 
confronting similar problems in scaling informational changes on the network and 
are instead proceeding with a different set of proposed changes, with the intent of 
changing the underlying consensus algorithm itself. Ethereum has emerged as a 
competitor to Bitcoin among major cryptocurrencies and is currently testing a 
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different process by which rules as fundamental as the underlying consensus 
algorithm are changed. This provides a clear example by which dominant 
cryptocurrencies are currently competing in terms of governance—a phenomenon 
discussed in detail in sections V and VI.  
 
 This concern over governance is unique to permissionless blockchains. In 
the case of a central authority tightly defining the location or powers of a particular 
network node, the means by which rule changes occur are not necessarily related 
to the network nodes’ roles or preferences in any way and instead are a function of 
ordinary centralized firm decision-making.59 In contrast, the design of 
permissionless blockchains means anyone with the right hardware, internet access, 
and reliable electricity can become a participant and hence have incentives and 
beliefs about the appropriate scope and form of blockchain governance. 
Decentralized validation of network processes coupled with distributed 
maintenance of the underlying ledger means that network participants necessarily 
have direct influence over the continuance or change of the ruleset governing all 
network processes.60 This implicates an aspect of governance typically reserved to 
public organizations, where constituents cannot opt out of the processes to which 
they are subject. Arguably, participants on a given blockchain are facing much 
lower exit costs in terms of their preferred governance than an employee subject to 
the centralized policies determined by private firm leadership. Their decision is 
more akin to investors who choose to move money from one firm to another based 
upon the governance decisions made by the firms in question. Nonetheless, on 
permissionless blockchains, the validation of network transactions is designed to 
prevent participants from evading the universal rules. This makes a similar 
influence over input to the ruleset incentive compatible. Unlike traditional firms, 
the equivalent of shareholders in a given permissionless blockchain are also 
engaged in the output of that blockchain. This stands as a powerful departure from 
traditional models of private governance.61  
 
Similarly, blockchain network participants, and to a lesser extent, users, also 
have strong beliefs about the appropriate scope and form of the functions to which 
a given blockchain will be applied. Thus, certain proposals to alter the fundamental 
rule set underlying a given blockchain are frequently argued to be at odds with the 
“constitutional” principles that guided the definition of the blockchain in the first 
                                                             
59 Dᴇ Fɪʟɪᴘᴘɪ & Wʀɪɢʜᴛ, supra note 35, at 31. 
60 Zheng et al., supra note 50. 
61 See Nick Cowen, Markets for Rules: The Promise and Peril of Blockchain Distributed Governance 
9(2) J. ENTR. & PUB POL’Y 213 (2019). 





place.62 Originalist arguments have appeared in the context of proposed changes to 
the Bitcoin blockchain, and in the case of Ethereum, one of the founders plays a 
major role in ongoing debates about changes to the underlying blockchain.63 
Debates surrounding the intent for Bitcoin to become a major store of value and 
payment network, as compared to the intent for the currency to be immutable in 
terms of the rules governing its creation and transfer, are fundamentally debates 
about the true constitutional spirit of the blockchain as expressed through the 
specific rules governing network processes.  
 
A. Blockchains and Constitutions 
How, then, can blockchains be understood as a system of governance 
analogous to that created by a constitution? The participants, or network nodes, in 
a given blockchain play the role of the government, whereas the users of a given 
blockchain can be seen as constituents. While network participants are not 
representative agents in the exact sense politicians are, they are performing 
governance functions on behalf of users who request transactions or store value on 
the cryptocurrency blockchain. The fundamental rules of the blockchain create a 
form of agency control by constraining the participants in the interest of the users, 
which creates an equilibrium that operates to the benefit of the constrained 
participants. Changes to cryptocurrency blockchains can thus affect any of the 
following: (i) the core definition of the underlying unit of value; (ii) the process of 
transactional validation by network participants; (iii) the incentives of network 
participants (often implicated by changes to transactional processes); or (iv) the 
comparative ability of a given blockchain to achieve its network objectives in 
comparison to the ability of competing blockchains to do so.  
 
An important distinction between blockchain governance and modern 
constitutional democracies lies in the absolute lack of separation of powers. 
Blockchain participants exercise executive, legislative, and judicial functions 
simultaneously. As participants successfully solve the cryptographic hash function 
underlying the proof of work algorithm, they are simultaneously processing 
network transactions and generating network resources (the underlying 
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cryptocurrency), while other participants mechanically validate proposed 
transactions’ conformity with underlying network rules.64 Each of these processes 
can be likened to a distinct role of government. Cryptocurrency production and the 
proposal of minor rule changes, together, are the equivalent of legislation. 
Processing transactions of existing cryptocurrency is like the execution of law. 
Ensuring conformity with network rules is akin to the judicial function of finally 
determining violations of the law by constituents.65 Currently, the incentives to 
perform these functions are linked to the production function; miners engage in 
costly processing of transactions due to the anticipated reward for successfully 
solving the underlying cryptographic hash function that accompanies their doing 
so. 
 
Blockchains, unlike government processes and judicial review, do not allow 
for the informal remedies for adjustments to the rule structure to better fit the needs 
and aims of those governed by the ruleset. Granted, blockchain participants can 
adjust their uses of the blockchain to some limited extent, but they cannot directly 
interpret the underlying fundamental rule structure like government and judicial 
actors can in terms of constitutional implementation and interpretation. Put 
differently, the extent of discretion afforded to the government to make the Civil 
Rights Act a reality, or the extent of judicial interpretation that the Bill of Rights 
has required (and will continue to require), far exceeds the scope of choice 
blockchain network participants have in terms of the scope, form, and frequency of 
transactions to undertake. Coherence and supremacy are practically guaranteed in 
blockchain processes, which can be a double-edged sword when it comes to 
punishing bad-faith actors on the network, as the subsequent discussion about the 
DAO hack on the Ethereum blockchain emphasizes. Reversing a bad action under 
current governance processes takes the equivalent of a constitutional amendment. 
 
One of the most important distinctions between changes to blockchains and 
constitutional amendment processes surrounds the notion of forking the chain of 
code. Three distinct, predominant means66 of forking exist: (i) a soft fork, which 
results in compatibility for network nodes that have not yet adopted the new rule 
change; (ii) a hard fork that would result in network nodes that have not accepted 
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the new rule change rejecting blocks created under the new rule set; and (iii) hard 
forks that result in two permanently separate versions of the underlying blockchain, 
one under the old ruleset and one under the new ruleset.67 Major rule changes, 
including updates to the block size, result in hard forks, which create the possibility 
for deterioration in network processes and outright errors, and as such, involve 
considerable debate in a given blockchain community prior to their adoption. In the 
second case of hard forks, unlike constitutional amendment, two blockchains can 
exist where there once was one, and participants and users subsequently decide 
(through their support of network processes and choice of transactional medium) 
which chain to support.68 These choices in rule updates each influence the exit costs 
facing participants and users if they do not like a particular rule change.69 With both 
soft and hard forks that do not result in a new cryptocurrency, the participants and 
users can only exit from the underlying blockchain entirely, as opposed to 
continuing their participation and use on the chain of the forked cryptocurrency that 
they most prefer. The choice of whether or not a hard fork will result in a viable 
second chain (and associated currency) is clearly utilized in cryptocurrency 
communities, with an announced hard fork of Ethereum (Constantinople) that will 
not result in a viable second chain, accompanied by discussion as to whether a 
second chain would emerge.70 Such an outcome depends on the extent to which 
participants accept or reject the proposed rule changes, as well as the specific 
changes to the protocol layer itself that the proposed update makes. 
 
In contrast, after a constitutional amendment, constituents are uniformly 
governed by the altered constitution, and the old constitution only governs those 
legal claims that emanated when the prior version of the constitution was in force. 
This means fundamental changes in rule sets on blockchains are subject to 
competitive pressures after the fact, with the former rule set potentially remaining 
a viable transaction and currency network, which allows for subsequent revelation 
of the perceived value of the network change. This distinction means blockchains 
are subject to competitive pressures on a number of margins which constitutional 
governance is not, notwithstanding the limited ability of constituents to move from 
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one constitutional regime to another (to the extent they can afford to do so). This 
also means that in cases where a cryptocurrency forks to reflect distinct governance 
preferences on the part of different groups of network participants, this operates as 
a low-cost form of exit—both groups can be governed by their preferred set of 
constitutional rules, although they can no longer transact with one another on the 
same blockchain as before.71 All of this implies that the choice to fork presents an 
important strategic margin for blockchain network participants considering rule 
changes.72  
 
 The scope of activities governed by a blockchain is much smaller than those 
defined by the legislative process in modern constitutional orders; the former is 
limited to a small number of processes, whereas the latter is only cabined by the 
boundaries the constitution places on the action of the government. This variance 
in “legislative” scope has a corollary implication: the comparative importance of 
the judicial function increases as legislative scope increases. If a governance regime 
has a known and limited set of functions, the interpretation of the conformity of 
these functions with underlying network rules is a relatively simple process. 
However, as the nature and interpretability of network functions increases, the 
challenge, and hence, systemic importance of ensuring that these functions are in 
accordance with underlying rules similarly increases. This results in a comparative 
certainty of application of blockchain rules, as compared to constitutional rules; 
although, to the extent that blockchains follow through with proposed changes to 
include decentralized transactional processing and validation, this is likely to create 
unique challenges, as discussed in the section treating the Lightning Network and 
Sharding below. This means the implementation of changes to the underlying 
blockchain rules is much more certain. Blockchain rule changes have less need for 
interpretation in subsequent periods but are also less subject to downstream political 
pressures than constitutions, which require executive discretion in their 
implementation, coupled with judicial interpretation to oversee the constitutionality 
of this implementation. 
 
 Unlike constitutional government at the national level, those governed by a 
particular blockchain face much lower exit costs and can also be simultaneously 
governed by several blockchains to the extent they mine or transact in more than 
one cryptocurrency.73 This provides an interesting analog to the decentralized 
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governance arrangements studied in a number of contexts.74 Consider the extent to 
which blockchain participants and users can freely enter and exit the governance 
arrangements of a given cryptocurrency, and compare it to the proposed and 
existing real-world governance schemes intended to harness similar governance 
benefits as a function of the largely voluntary presence of their constituents; there 
is significant overlap between the two.75 The comparatively low-cost exit option 
both disciplines blockchain network participants in their choices of rule changes 
and serves as a margin of competition when rule changes implicate exit costs 
directly, as the discussion in section VI emphasizes. 
 
 The means by which constitutional amendment can proceed in ordinary 
political systems provide a blueprint by which to consider similarly fundamental 
governance changes on permissionless blockchains. Ultimately, the certainty of the 
application of blockchain network rules and the comparatively low exit costs facing 
cryptocurrency users reduce the importance of ex-post constitutional interpretation 
as amending the ruleset itself. For example, in the case of judicial review, there is 
no clear analogy because of the decentralized fashion in which network transactions 
are validated; absent an ex-ante agreement among over half of network participants, 
a given network node (run by a network participant) could not use its own discretion 
to validate transactions at odds with the rules of the blockchain.76 The next informal 
means of constitutional change is that of adjustments in government processes and 
norms; in the case of blockchains, this involves participants and users’ 
understanding of network capabilities and limitations, and their ability to adjust 
their network uses accordingly. One example of this would be users limiting their 
transactions on the Bitcoin network to a certain minimal threshold, below which 
the network fees for doing so do not make economic sense. Next, it is possible in 
theory to develop subsidiary layers of code governed by distinct rule sets (or simply 
rules that do not need to be validated by the entire network); in each case, these 
would operate like political and administrative decentralization, respectively. In the 
case of distinct rule sets, different network nodes (or a set of nodes) would operate 
their own rules or processes, although this would create coordination costs in 
reconciling different underlying processes with the primary chain itself; this is 
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something the Ethereum blockchain may be better suited to facilitating, given its 
focus on more complex transactional processes.77 In the case of the same rules, a 
subset of network nodes would be responsible for processing and validating 
network processes without wholesale validation occurring across the entire 
network. Importantly, in order for these decentralized processes to occur, this 
would require the support of a sufficient majority of network participants—
blockchain’s equivalent of a constitutional amendment. Finally, in the most well-
known process (given the debates surrounding formal changes to the network 
rules), if a sufficient number of network nodes adopt a proposed rule change or 
changes, then the primary blockchain will be governed by these rules accordingly 
(with those set of network nodes that rejected the rule change operating under the 
old set of rules if a specific type of hard fork occurs).78  
 
Accordingly, when it comes to governance, permissionless blockchain 
participants have three alternatives when it comes to adjusting governance. They 
can amend the rules underlying the blockchain itself (including those such as 
forking, which greatly shape exit costs), they can develop subsidiary governance 
processes that prevent the need for adaptation of the main blockchain, or they can 
adjust their use of a given blockchain, either directly, or by choosing to exit 
altogether and participate in or use another blockchain whose governance better 
resolves that participant’s fundamental aims. 
B. Cryptocurrency Governance Debates 
Governance debates in cryptocurrency communities have resulted in a 
number of proposed and realized solutions that contain direct parallels to 
constitutional design choices intended to reduce agency costs while simultaneously 
capturing scale economies in governance. These debates have implicated 
fundamental beliefs as to the most important governance principles that should be 
realized in the rule sets of a given cryptocurrency blockchain, as in the case of 
Ethereum and Ethereum Classic. Smaller changes to these blockchains (like block 
size) have nonetheless resulted in sufficient disagreement to where distinct 
governance regimes have emerged, such as the hard fork between Bitcoin and 
Bitcoin Cash. Different forms of subsidiary governance solutions have emerged as 
proposals, including both administrative and judicial decentralization, as well as 
elements of relational contracting, in the cases of the Bitcoin Lightning Network 
and the proposed Ethereum changes of Plasma and sharding. Wholesale change to 
governance processes is also being explored in the case of Ethereum’s proposal to 
transition their blockchain from a proof-of-work consensus method to a proof-of-
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stake algorithm, in what would be the closest case to amending amendment rules 
themselves. Finally, new entrants have explicitly conditioned their competitive 
advantage on choices of blockchain governance, suggesting that permissionless 
blockchains will continue to be an important locus of innovation in private 
governance as participants and users exit from blockchains whose governance 
choices are less representative than others.  
 
1. Ethereum and Ethereum Classic 
 In 2016, the Ethereum community was split between two governance 
alternatives in response to a well-publicized hack resulting in the loss of nearly $50 
million of Ether. The Ethereum community had developed an organization for 
signaling community confidence in proposed applications (decentralized apps or 
dApps) for use on the Ethereum blockchain. The Decentralized Autonomous 
Organization (DAO)—effectively a complex smart contract running on the 
Ethereum blockchain—was intended to serve as a means of funding different 
proposed applications using the decentralized input of individual users. Following 
a screening process accomplished via known network figureheads, users who had 
bought tokens in the DAO could then, in theory, allocate these tokens to projects, 
and once projects had reached a 20 percent token threshold for acceptance, they 
would be funded via the Ether held by the DAO.79 Taken at face value, the DAO 
presented a governance innovation in that the investment decisions would have 
involved human decision-making by screening projects ex-ante through existing 
reputation, social capital, and authority within the community. This presented the 
direct possibility that smart contracts can still involve elements of relational 
contracting. 
 
However, a flaw in the code intended to prevent “bank runs” (which 
required Ether withdrawn from the DAO in response to approved applications to 
be held for 28 days), enabled hackers to capture $50 million of Ether.80 This flaw 
in the code resulted in a major governance challenge for network users. Maintaining 
fidelity to what were argued to be core principles governing the blockchain meant 
allowing the hackers to get away with $50 million. If instead, the blockchain could 
be dialed back to the state immediately preceding the hack, then those who 
benefited from the coins that were withdrawn from the DAO would never have 
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received their tokens. This latter option violated what many network participants 
saw as hard principles governing the creation and transfer of Ether on the Ethereum 
blockchain — transfers of Ether, once completed according to network rules, were 
immutable and given that the blockchain had already updated in light of the funds 
transferred out of the DAO. These funds going to the individual (or individuals) 
who exploited the flaw in the DAO code was a scenario seen as preferable to going 
against accepted rules governing the transfer of Ether on the Ethereum 
blockchain.81 What came into conflict here was the extent to which participants 
believed faithfulness to the immutability of network processes should take 
precedence over punishing clearly wrongful activity — essentially a conflict of 
constitutional beliefs. As of July 20th, 2020, Ethereum’s market capitalization of 
$26.3 billion was over thirty-five times that of Ethereum Classic.82 This suggests 
that more network participants and users believed in the importance of punishing 
bad actors, especially when it came to convincing new cryptocurrency adoptees that 
subsidiary systems on the Ethereum network had the willingness and the ability to 
punish bad actors who exploit weaknesses in code.  
 
2. Bitcoin v. Bitcoin Cash 
 One strain the existing Bitcoin blockchain has put on network participants 
and users is the ability to process payments in a timely fashion. The block size of 
the Bitcoin blockchain, along with the difficulty of the hash function miners are 
solving, effectively determines the number of transactions the network can process 
in a given time period. Transactions per second is the common measure among 
major payment networks like Visa, with the Visa network averaging 1,700 
transactions per second (and an underlying capacity of 47,000 transactions per 
second).83 In contrast, the Bitcoin network can process roughly seven transactions 
per second.84 More problematically, as the number of users of Bitcoin increases, 
this number of transactions remains the same because of the fixed size of blocks of 
data that are added to the Bitcoin blockchain and the largely fixed-rate at which the 
hash function is solved. Put differently, more network participants have to get in 
line for a process that only serves one customer at a time and that takes roughly the 
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same time to conclude each time. Thus, the more people transacting in Bitcoin, the 
greater the delay each transacting party faces before their transaction can conclude.  
 
 The implications are clear when it comes to Bitcoin’s ability to be a payment 
network that can effectively serve a greater number of users. As a result, one hard 
fork resulted in a distinct cryptocurrency called Bitcoin Cash. Bitcoin Cash uses 
similar network processes to those supporting Bitcoin but involves a larger block 
size, thus allowing for greater transactional speed. As of July 20th, 2020, Bitcoin 
Cash’s market capitalization stood at $4.1 billion, while that of Bitcoin stood at 
over forty times greater, at nearly $170 billion.85 Notwithstanding the large 
disparity in valuation, Bitcoin Cash is currently the fifth largest cryptocurrency by 
market capitalization, which suggests a large number of participants and users saw 
considerable value in the underlying network changes. However, the nature of 
comparative market capitalizations poses the question of the extent to which 
competition among closely related blockchains will result in multiple viable 
currencies. A given currency’s value as a medium of exchange depends on 
widespread adoption, which creates a clear long-term downside to multiple closely 
related currencies. Can they compete as effectively as entirely distinct 
cryptocurrencies whose brand could more clearly signal underlying distinctions in 
blockchain governance choices? Forking as a means of reducing exit costs for 
network participants is not without its own costs to the network and may not always 
be a desirable option. 
 
3. Lightning Network (BTC) & Plasma/Sharding (ETH) 
Interestingly, both Bitcoin and Ethereum participants have begun to explore 
solutions from the realm of relational contracting and decentralized governance in 
order to overcome the problem of scale created by the proof-of-work algorithm 
underlying each blockchain. In the case of the Bitcoin blockchain, a proposed 
modification would effectively create a subsidiary network for handling 
transactions among network users who repeatedly transact with one another. This 
proposal, known as the Lightning Network, is in response to the same underlying 
problem that led to the fork between Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash. The Lightning 
Network is a proposal to move transactions off-chain by relying on existing 
relationships among Bitcoin users. This would create a payment channel between 
users, effectively allowing a limitless number of transactions between two parties 
that have a payment channel between them. Once the parties have closed the 
channel, the resulting net balance between the two would be posted to the Bitcoin 
blockchain in a single transaction, significantly reducing the network load among 
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users that repeatedly transact with and (likely) know one another. The proposal also 
envisions numerous channels open among multiple users, intended to create a web 
effect in which many transactions could occur off-chain, requiring only a few 
transactions to finally post to the blockchain.86 Existing constraints have meant that 
microtransactions in Bitcoin were impractical, given the long wait times and 
network fees that could outstrip the value of the transaction. This led to third parties 
willing to intermediate microtransactions, but the existence of such intermediaries 
stands in contrast to the founding principles of a decentralized payment system 
intended to fundamentally disintermediate transactions. By instead relying on the 
existing repeated relationships among Bitcoin network users, this proposed change 
leverages the power of relational contracting to overcome the problem of scalability 
created by the fundamental underlying ruleset. 
 
Given the similarities between the underlying blockchains’ protocols 
supporting Bitcoin and Ether, Ethereum participants have also developed an 
analogous solution, making the validation of smart contracts occur on a sublayer, a 
proposed update to network rules called Plasma. Plasma is similar to the Lightning 
Network, except it involves the validation of contracts as opposed to the validation 
of transactions among repeat players. In each case, only a small proportion of the 
activity on the subsidiary layer appears on and is validated by the network 
governing the primary blockchain.87 Importantly though, this does not involve the 
uniform enforcement of formally encoded blockchain rules to be operative on the 
blockchain sublayer, unlike sharding, which will be discussed next. Thus, this form 
of governance solution is most akin to administrative or political decentralization, 
where a subset of participants wholly govern subsidiary processes with a new set 
of rules that they themselves define.  
 
 Another related governance solution explored by Ethereum participants is 
called sharding and is incorporated into recent proposals made by Ethereum 
founder Vitalik Buterin. These proposals address the amount of policy adaptation 
likely to take place on the second layer of protocol, as opposed to the primary layer 
of the Ethereum blockchain itself.88 The proposed change is similar to classic 
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governance solutions intended to overcome problems created by the increase in the 
scale of processes, whether it be from the scope of government policies, the number 
of people governed by them, or both. Sharding involves the replication of some or 
all Ethereum blockchain processes in a subsidiary blockchain managed by one or 
more network participants.89 The Ethereum logo is a crystal, which clarifies the 
governance design underlying sharding. Each fragment of a larger crystal, known 
as a shard, duplicates the internal molecular crystalline structure of the larger 
crystal. In practice, sharding is a blockchain-specific form of judicial 
decentralization, where the validation of network transactions occurs on only a 
subset of participants’ nodes. Where this process stands as a potentially unique 
governance innovation is that judicial decentralization is typically a function of 
political decentralization, where subnational governments define law that is 
subsequently adjudicated at the same level; here the blockchain rules would remain 
the same, but only a subset of network participants would be responsible for 
ensuring conformity with those rules.90 A fundamental trade-off of decentralization 
is squarely apparent in the case of sharding. Increases in terms of the scalability of 
network processes are weighed against the additional costs of governance on each 
individual shard, as well as the coordination costs of reconciling individual shard 
states with respect to the primary layer blockchain. The ability to maintain a greater 
number of transactions with greater variance in applicable rules can be seen as a 
governance solution designed to reduce the incentives to exit the blockchain due to 
the greater likelihood that a given user and participants’ governance preferences 
will be accommodated in the more relational or decentralized arrangements 
intended to result. 
 
4. Proof-of-Stake (ETH) 
 One of the most fundamental governance changes being debated among 
cryptocurrency network participants surrounds transitioning Ethereum from a 
proof-of-work (PoW) to a proof-of-stake (PoS) consensus algorithm. This proposed 
change directly approaches the problem of electricity intensity and network 
congestion leading to high transaction fees and slow processing time, two of the 
major obstacles to any cryptocurrency network functioning at scale. For 
commercial actors to readily adopt cryptocurrency payment methods, they need 
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assurance that payments will process quickly and will not cost the vendor a 
significant proportion of the underlying transaction. Perversely, buying a car with 
a cryptocurrency may currently present fewer obstacles than buying a latte with a 
given cryptocurrency. 
 Transitioning from PoW to PoS involves a wholesale change to the 
algorithm that produces, changes, and validates cryptocurrency ledger states. 
Instead of a race to solve a cryptographic hash function, network consensus about 
proposed changes to the underlying ledger is achieved through Ether holders 
staking a portion of their holdings to become a network validator. The intention 
behind the design derives directly from the concept of increased exit costs creating 
beneficial governance incentives; validators that have staked a significant amount 
of valuable Ether are much more likely to have the continued stability and viability 
of the network in mind when validating new proposed blocks. Successfully 
proposed blocks will reward their relevant stakeholders not only in terms of new 
Ether but also via the fees associated with the transactions contained in a given 
block.91 The proposed intent is to run the new blockchain on a test network for a 
certain period of time, which makes this a phased transition, with the network 
eventually transitioning at a known rate to a blockchain exclusively supported by 
PoS as opposed to PoW processes. Ethereum’s co-founder, Vitalik Buterin, is 
clearly concerned about governance compatibilities created by the simultaneous 
existence of different consensus algorithms, as some of his technical output 
suggests.92 
 
 The phased transition reflects the profound change in network processes 
that changing the consensus algorithm would entail. Unlike adjusting the size of 
blocks, transaction fees, and new currency rewards, or even creating a subsidiary 
layer of governance, a change to the consensus algorithm is equivalent to changing 
the amendment rules of a constitution. Thus, the debates surrounding the change 
have been longer and more intense than debates over alterations in fees and hash 
function difficulty. If Ethereum transitions entirely to a PoS protocol, then all 
fundamental rule alterations in the future will proceed via a completely different 
governance process. Essentially, the new consensus mechanism is a proposal to 
change the entire structure of government for the Ethereum blockchain, and as such, 
stands as an amendment to the amendment processes themselves, if not a wholesale 
constitutional overhaul. If successful, it will be worth observing closely how other 
competing blockchains react to the benefits and costs revealed by a completely new 
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system of blockchain governance, especially in the case of blockchains like Tezos 
and EOS that have emerged in direct response to the governance tensions described 
thus far. However, the magnitude of change and the implications for all the network 
processes on the Ethereum blockchain have led to numerous missed deadlines 
associated with the launch of this change, which was originally rumored to be 
completed sometime in 2017.93 Given how central to the long-term viability of the 
Ethereum network the PoS upgrade has been argued to be, it will be interesting to 
see whether network participants choose to support the upgrade, create a second 
currency based on the Ethereum blockchain up to that point (separate from 
Ethereum Classic), or exit the system altogether. 
 
5. Emergent Governance Competitors: Tezos & EOS 
 This type of governance competition has already been occurring in the 
realm of cryptocurrencies, though. When Tezos was released in 2017, its initial coin 
offering (ICO) was one of the most successful to that point, raising $232 million.94 
The amount raised in an ICO can be seen as a version of an initial public offering, 
except governed by considerably less regulatory oversight. As investors have 
crowded into the space, there has been considerable fraud in terms of the extent to 
which companies issuing new coins actually have viable business models to support 
the bet in their business model that a purchase of an ICO typically implies.95 In the 
case of Tezos, the innovation surrounded blockchain governance processes 
themselves, a direct competitive response to the strains facing the dominant 
cryptocurrency blockchains supporting Bitcoin and Ether. Importantly, since the 
emergence of Tezos, Ethereum proposals have converged on a similar governance 
solution: that of PoS described above. Tezos allows for token holders to vote on 
proposed changes to the network’s governance protocols—a node proposes a 
change along with a price associated with the cost they require to implement the 
change.96 In theory, this would allow for dynamic network pricing of governance 
innovations. As importantly, the emergence of Tezos in response to existing 
governance problems among the dominant cryptocurrencies in terms of scalability 
displays competitive private governance in practice. However, it should be noted 
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that Tezos has since faced profound governance issues in the real world, something 
that has held up its deployment and resulted in numerous lawsuits against the 
company.97 While network participants and users should pay close attention to the 
governance changes being wrought on the networks in which they are invested, this 
does not mean that choices regarding corporate structure and regulatory compliance 
under public constitutional structures no longer matter.98 This lesson is often 
forgotten amidst the exuberance that early cryptocurrency adopters have for radical 
decentralization.  
 
 EOS is a more recently emergent competitor to the Ethereum and Bitcoin 
blockchains. EOS, in direct response to the scalability issues that created the 
governance challenges described thus far, is based upon a delegated proof-of-stake 
system. Similar to Tezos, EOS was the most successful ICO of its time, raising 
several billion dollars in support, although the exact number remains subject to the 
volatility of Ether, the cryptocurrency in which the ICO was denominated.99 
Interestingly, the founders have directly argued that this system is analogous to the 
governance of a republic, where representative agents oversee the processing and 
validation of network transactions.100 These agents are elected by the network 
community, presumably with some form of punishment in subsequent electoral 
rounds if their adherence to network rules and fundamental governance beliefs is 
revealed to be lacking. Instead of staking the network’s currency, participants and 
users vote on representative agents, with their number of votes being proportionally 
equivalent to the size of their stake in the network.101 This method is designed to 
overcome another fundamental governance challenge not unique to blockchains: 
money in politics. In the case of Ethereum’s proposed changes, the requirement of 
large Ether holdings in order to become a network validatory could in theory result 
in these participants validating proposed blocks due to self-interest, as opposed to 
those blocks’ conformity with the underlying ruleset of the network. By allowing 
participants and users to aggregate their votes behind network participants that 
                                                             
97 Thijs Maas, The Curious Tale of Tezos: From a $32 MILLION ICO to 4 Class Action Lawsuits, 
HACKERNOON.COM (Apr. 6, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/the-curious-tale-of-tezos-from-a-232-
million-ico-to-4-class-action-lawsuits-6f411b7aad7e [https://perma.cc/3HPM-V4QE]. 
98 See Eric Alston “Blockchain and the Law: Legality, Law-like Characteristics, and Legal 
Applications,” in James Caton, ed., HANDBOOK ON BLOCKCHAIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCIES. 
(Forthcoming 2021). 
99 Kate Rooney, A Blockchain Start-up Just Raised $4 Billion without a Live Product, CNBC (May 
31, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/31/a-blockchain-start-up-just-raised-4-billion-without-
a-live-product.html [https://perma.cc/35ZP-EGWP]. 
100 See Aaron Stanley, EOS: Unpacking the Big Promises Behind a Possible Blockchain Contender, 
COINDESK.COM (June 25, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/eos-unpacking-the-big-promises-
behind-a-possible-blockchain-contender/ [https://perma.cc/8XGB-LUFX]. 
101 See Berg, Berg, & Novak, supra note 72, at 10. 





those individuals believe will process and validate transactions in good faith, EOS’s 
consensus algorithm is designed to mitigate the scale advantage that large holdings 
in the network are likely to create for certain Ethereum stakeholders.102 This is not 
to argue to that EOS’ chosen governance mechanisms are superior, but instead to 
emphasize how they serve as an example of governance innovations occurring as 
blockchain networks distinguish themselves from one another on the institutional 
margins defined in this article. 
In this section, I have provided a variety of examples of the ways that 
permissionless blockchains have already begun exploring institutional forms more 
traditionally associated with public constitutional ordering. In the following 
section, I explore additional constitutional design features that are likely to emerge 
as a result of their nearly ubiquitous role in public constitutional ordering.  
 
C. Competitive Constitutional Governance on Blockchains 
Despite the numerous differences between the comparatively narrow set of 
network processes determined by a blockchain’s fundamental rule structure and the 
broad range of human behavior governed by constitutions, those seeking to better 
understand governance debates surrounding blockchains would do well to consider 
the long history of constitutions.103 Debates about the fundamental principles of 
governance inevitably implicate constitutional amendments, and the extent to 
which a given governance structure can accommodate changes desired by a 
sufficient number of constituents can directly determine how well that governance 
structure can achieve its intended functions. In a competitive world, where network 
users and participants bet on the viability of one blockchain over another, 
governance provides an important margin for competition. This effectively 
determines how well a blockchain can adapt to emergent network problems and the 
changing demands of network users. In an important sense, blockchain users are 
the ultimate sovereigns because the extent to which individuals choose to store 
value and transact on a given blockchain determines the valuation of the 
cryptocurrency. This, in turn, defines the incentives for network participants to 
verify and process transactions. In this sense, network participants are constrained 
by the changes to the network that their choices create; if the changes diverge 
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sufficiently from network users’ intended purposes, these users can simply use the 
network less or depart from it entirely.   
 
Cryptocurrency blockchains provide a unique example of private 
governance whose core characteristics overlap with a number of those typically 
associated with public governance.104 Unlike the traditional centralized hierarchy 
of firm governance, all participants in the collective output of a given 
cryptocurrency blockchain can influence the fundamental rules governing this 
output. Nonetheless, these rules are subject to market choice by users in a way that 
public governance at the nation-state level typically is not: cryptocurrency users 
can readily vote with their feet. This means the blockchains supporting 
cryptocurrencies are a unique case study in private governance,105 in which 
unusually decentralized decisions surrounding fundamental rule sets are subject to 
competitive market pressures facilitated by relatively low exit costs. These 
blockchains thus mix governance features traditionally associated with public and 
private organizations, respectively. Allowing for uniform and clearly regulated 
input from all participants in the process as to the fundamental rule sets governing 
them, while simultaneously subjecting this governance process to competitive 
pressures, is a unique innovation in governance that should pique the interest of 
institutional scholars and practitioners. 
 
This infers that exit costs greatly define the incentives of individuals 
choosing to make costly bets on network participation and use. In a context where 
exit costs are relatively low, the stakes of any given group decision are necessarily 
lower106 (provided, of course, that the group decision itself does not directly 
implicate exit costs). For anyone who lives sufficiently close to the border of a state 
rewriting its constitution, the downside risk associated with constitutional change 
is lower. If the outcomes are sufficiently undesirable for any given individual who 
faces low moving costs, that individual will likely choose to move rather than incur 
the costs associated with the change in governance. In practice, though, even 
moving a few miles across state lines poses a significant cost, especially as 
compared to the cost of choosing to mine or transact in another cryptocurrency. 
This simple fact of relatively low exit costs for cryptocurrency users and 
participants has important implications for the dynamics likely to result from 
constitutional level governance changes to a given blockchain. Interestingly, 
though, exit costs are only one side of the ways in which networks can condition 
membership – entry costs are another option, albeit one that has yet to be encoded 
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into a cryptocurrency blockchain.107 As I have noted, though, Ethereum proposed 
change to its consensus mechanism directly creates an entry cost for anyone seeking 
to become a network validator. 
 
One cause of these low exit costs is the nature of blockchain rule changes 
themselves such as the possibility for a fork that reflects both opposing participants’ 
governance preferences on a given issue also lowers the stakes associated with a 
given rule change. Whether or not a given set of cryptocurrency participants’ 
governance preference on an issue carries the day, if a fork in the blockchain 
reflecting their preferences will persist after the rule change, this reduces the costs 
of such change in governance to the “losers.” A second characteristic of 
cryptocurrency communities also reduces the cost of governance changes to losers; 
literal exit from participation or use of the cryptocurrency itself. Moving one’s stake 
in a given cryptocurrency blockchain to another permissionless-blockchain-
supported cryptocurrency, or into more traditional financial instruments altogether, 
facilitates exit to a level never enjoyed by individuals who are subject to traditional 
public constitutional governance. 
 
Because exit costs directly influence the incentives of network participants, 
these exit costs themselves create a potential margin for competition over 
governance. Exit costs influence participants’ and users’ incentives both during 
periods of ordinary network operation, as well as times when governance changes 
are being wrought. Similar to a variety of investment contexts, the speed at which 
one can convert a costly investment into a more liquid asset directly affects 
individuals’ willingness to invest, and, accordingly, the return offered on the 
investment.108 But the effects of exit costs are not limited to the individual 
incentives of network users and participants. Because exit costs influence the 
changes in governance that are likely to be realized, network participants have an 
additional channel by which their incentives are implicated. Is a reduction in 
network participants and the emergence of a competing but closely related 
cryptocurrency worth the benefit of the more representative governance that is 
likely to result in contexts where exit costs are lower? Participants must thus 
examine how a rule change will affect both their own incentives and the exit 
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decisions of other participants. They must also consider how comparatively better 
or worse outcomes will then affect a similar calculus on the part of network users. 
 
Lower exit costs thus facilitate greater competition in governance, which is 
often argued to result in benefits associated with both enhanced government 
accountability to citizens and experimental discovery.109 Lower exit costs also 
suggest greater variance in policy change to the extent that constituents self-select 
into the governance regime that most closely represents their preferences, as 
opposed to using their input to moderate governance change in a regime in which 
they are a minority.110 However, cryptocurrencies dependent on proof-of-work 
algorithms need a sufficient number of miners to prevent attacks. These attacks 
result when one set of network nodes controls more than fifty-one percent (51%) 
of the computing power on the network. This means sufficient exit of miners carries 
costs to the network writ large in ways that are similarly costly to users choosing to 
stop transacting in the currency altogether. Because of this trade-off in terms of the 
representativeness of governance, the sufficiency of network participation, and the 
use to achieve its intended purposes, it is clear that lower exit costs are not 
uniformly better.  
 
In the context of Ethereum in particular, two things indicate attempts to 
influence exit costs on the margins in ways that mean participants cannot as easily 
choose to exit, whether to another Ethereum-based cryptocurrency or to another 
cryptocurrency altogether: (i) the use of hard forks that do not result in two viable 
chains111 and (ii) the intent to make certain types of computer processors less 
profitable for network participants.112 Another important aspect of exit costs 
surrounds the relationship between blockchain rule sets and the public legal systems 
in which blockchain participants and users reside.113 EOS has a written constitution 
that specifies, among other things, forums for dispute resolution among network 
participants and users. This suggests that the choice of the public legal system as a 
backdrop for on-chain disputes will prove an additional margin of competition. 
Importantly, choosing to resolve a blockchain-related dispute before the courts is 
another exit cost that different blockchain governance regimes will likely compete 
on. 
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Currently, though, the scope of the rules governing network processes on a 
given permissionless blockchain is largely up for grabs by the same consensus 
mechanism. This means that larger rule changes proceed with the same level of 
consensus from network participants as more ordinary ones. Given the lessons from 
constitutional design surrounding the necessarily expressive nature of defining and 
changing a constitution, network participants are likely to increasingly consider 
rule entrenchment as a design choice surrounding certain governance parameters. 
The extreme of unamendability is baked into certain network design parameters 
from the get-go, but otherwise making certain aspects of governance likewise 
permanent is also an option that can provide a competitive governance margin for 
blockchain network designers, as well as network participants in terms of updating 
pre-existing governance choices.  
 
In sum, there are a number of competing forces resulting from governance 
choices that will greatly influence the number of viable cryptocurrencies: adoption, 
competition, and exit costs for participants and users. The need for sufficient 
adoption acts as a downward pressure on the number of cryptocurrencies; past a 
certain point, too many cryptocurrencies with tiny user bases will prevent their 
intended uses from being successful or will outright vitiate the benefits of 
permissionless blockchains altogether by making a fifty-one percent (51%) attack 
too easy. Competition between blockchains as a function of their outputs will 
similarly reward and discipline blockchains whose governance choices on these 
margins will determine their success and failure.114 Finally, the low costs of exit 
both facilitate competitive pressures and present a direct governance design choice 
on which cryptocurrency blockchains can compete. Do cryptocurrency users and 
participants prefer the lower exit costs associated with forking the blockchain and 
moving to other currencies, or can barriers to exit actually improve on-chain 
governance outcomes? 
 
These trade-offs can be understood by considering one example based on 
the currently dominant cryptocurrencies’ governance structures. Rigidities in these 
governance structures lend most of the benefits in terms of their use as currencies 
but have revealed a hidden set of costs surrounding the inability of these currencies 
to adapt to changing demands (to which some users would argue they should not 
adapt). This implies a competitive benefit to more blockchains whose governance 
models are slight to significantly different. In the long run, this should lead to more 
efficient blockchain governance, but it implies a trade-off for the design of 
blockchains themselves, as well as the market more broadly. Is a greater diversity 
of blockchains more efficient, or are fewer, more flexible blockchains ideal? While 
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flexibility has been linked to constitutional endurance, it is not as clear that the 
mutability of network rules is the right competitive margin for blockchain 
participants and users, especially as compared to exit costs. Blockchains’ value is 
only realized after a sufficient number of users adopt the use of cryptocurrency that 
a given blockchain supports. This suggests diminishing marginal returns to 
numerical competition in governance; the benefits of competition in governance 
between different blockchains cut against the benefits of scale that clearly exist in 
blockchains more generally. This means the optimal level of flexibility in 
blockchain governance can be seen as a function of the number of permissionless 
blockchains out there in a particular industry. Past a certain point, this could cut 
toward the need for fewer blockchains with more flexible governance mechanisms, 
including exit costs calibrated to make one’s participation and use of a 
cryptocurrency more or less “liquid.” 
 
A related trade-off surrounds the current nature of governance change that 
can fork the blockchain into two chains of code, which could be construed as 
facilitating competitive governance processes, or as stymying them. Firm 
governance is subject to competitive pressures. In theory, blockchain forks create a 
possibility analogous to that of cloning a firm and subjecting it to two distinct 
governance structures. However, in the case of a blockchain forking, it is not as if 
a randomized controlled trial in governance is occurring with respect to a single 
firm. Once a cryptocurrency has forked, the two new currencies are by and large 
competitors.115 Furthermore, competition among cryptocurrencies is occurring on 
a single originating blockchain, which creates an additional margin for competition. 
Is a cryptocurrency’s ability to compete with other cryptocurrencies diminished 
when it forks? Put differently, is its brand diluted when this occurs?116 A further 
interesting possibility surrounds the ability of blockchain participants and users to 
hold or divest the different currencies sometimes resulting from a hard fork. 
Someone holding Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash could exchange all of their holdings in 
one currency for holdings in the other as soon as these transactions could be 
processed and validated after the fork occurred. This means prices of the distinct 
cryptocurrencies subsequent to the fork can (at least in theory) reflect participants’ 
and users’ expected valuations of the underlying rule changes. This is only true to 
the extent that blockchain participants and users are sufficiently and accurately 
informed as to the underlying governance trade-offs described here, though. 
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Thus, it should be noted that the arguments contained herein about network 
participants’ and users’ input to governance depend upon awareness on the part of 
these individuals of potential changes in governance and the costs and benefits 
thereof. Accordingly, when considering blockchain governance changes, it is worth 
asking how many blockchain users are sufficiently familiar with these debates to 
be able to exercise a costly informed choice along the margins of governance 
variation described thus far. In the case of network participants, incentives are well-
aligned for them to be informed as to these trade-offs; participants’ input is required 
at a high level for changes to occur, and the continued value of participants’ costly 
investments in electricity and hardware depend significantly on the rules governing 
the creation of additional cryptocurrency.117 In the case of users—those who simply 
invest and transact in a given cryptocurrency—it is unclear just how well informed 
they might be about the costs and benefits of proposed governance changes. 
Nonetheless, because of their direct effect on the liquidity and value of 
cryptocurrency investments, exit costs are arguably among those most likely to be 
salient even to ordinary users of cryptocurrencies. If these costs increasingly 
become a competitive margin, this suggests there may be increased variance in 
governance in cryptocurrency blockchains, as one chain increases exit costs to 
retain its existing user and participant base, and another keeps exit costs low at the 
cost of losing a subset of its users and participants, at least in the short term. 
 
Granted, notwithstanding some level of ignorance on the part of users and 
participants as to the governance changes being debated, changes in the market 
valuation of cryptocurrency often follow the success or failure of a given proposed 
governance change. Nonetheless, given that network participants are by definition 
users—at least for the period following their successful mining of a given amount 
of the underlying cryptocurrency—their choices following successful and 
unsuccessful governance changes are likely to inform price signals accordingly. 
However, network participants account for only a fraction of network users. 
Furthermore, cryptocurrency price shocks occur for a variety of reasons other than 
governance changes, such as regulatory changes in countries with high levels of 
crypto users, or frauds or hacks of major exchanges. This paper is therefore 
intended to clearly spell out the economic and institutional trade-offs implicit in the 
seemingly esoteric governance debates occurring among cryptocurrency network 
participants. 
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IV.       CONCLUSION 
These debates over the best set of rules about making rules, or more typically, 
constitutions, are not an understudied topic. But in the context of private 
governance—where rule sets are typically more fluid, centrally controlled, and 
exist in the shadow of law and regulation—developing generalizable insights about 
comparatively superior governance mechanisms is more difficult. Permissionless 
cryptocurrency blockchains provide a fruitful context within which to explore these 
questions. These blockchain ecosystems can be understood as a type of 
constitutional rule set that both defines and legitimizes the activities supported by 
permissionless distributed ledger technology. The development of cryptocurrency 
blockchains has thus led to new forms of competition in private governance, which 
include exit costs as one of the fundamental margins upon which governance 
outcomes will be shaped between blockchains. Although less salient in design 
proposals currently, entry costs and rule entrenchment are also likely to play an 
increasing role as different chains continue to tweak their governance choices in 
light of the demands of network participants and users. 
 
Constitutional and political theorists should therefore neither be baffled by 
nor disinterested in the innovation currently occurring in governance processes on 
permissionless blockchains. These processes share many similarities to 
constitutional processes, and insights from constitutional design surrounding 
implementation and amendment shed considerable light on current developments 
in the communities supporting major cryptocurrency blockchains. The trade-off 
between flexibility and rigidity has caused divides in these communities as they 
debate how best to scale network processes while remaining true to the collectively 
expressed understanding of the constitutional rule set of each blockchain. Some 
changes to network processes that require the assent of a sufficient proportion of 
network participants do not fundamentally alter the rules by which network 
processes are governed. Instead, they affect the costs-and-benefits network 
participants expect as a reward for facilitating network processes of currency 
creation, validation of transactions, and participation in ongoing governance. 
Changes to data block size, hash function difficulty, transaction fees, and reward 
for hash function resolution all stand as examples of this type of constitutional 
change on the blockchain. Other changes implicate more fundamental additions or 
alterations to governance processes, such as the definition of subsidiary governance 
or an overhaul of the entire process of governance change itself. While the Bitcoin 
network’s most salient proposed changes have limited themselves to, at most, 
creating a sublayer of governance, Ethereum’s proposed changes not only include 
a related form of decentralized governance but also involve wholesale changes to 
the means by which future changes to network processes will occur.  
 





The study of public and private governance is now ancient. Thus, while 
blockchain processes present unique expressions of governance questions in new 
contexts, it is not as if challenges in obtaining consensus surrounding a given 
group’s processes and governance are new. This means that an understanding of 
the fundamental trade-offs associated with constitutional design questions, with a 
particular focus on amendment processes, could considerably benefit blockchain 
designers and participants. Flexibility in amendment is seen as allowing necessary 
adjustment absent which an entire constitutional order can be overturned. 
Nonetheless, amendment thresholds should be sufficiently high that fundamental 
rules are insulated from ordinary pressures. Constitutions are seen as trading off 
between facilitating economies of scale in governance while simultaneously 
creating agency problems among those individuals who provide direct input to 
legislative, executive, and judicial governance. Decentralization is one solution that 
allows for better representativeness while preventing a level of centralization that 
obviates the ability to govern the number of processes demanded by a given 
nation’s constituents. Thus, the relationship between blockchain participants and 
users as a function of the processes governing them is clarified through 
understanding the trade-offs that have long been debated in the context of 
constitutional design and subsequent amendments.  
 
Finally, decentralized processes similar to those of governance via executive, 
legislative, and adjudicative functions may never have been automated at the 
economic scale and complexity seen on permissionless cryptocurrency 
blockchains. Blockchains can, therefore, be seen as an early example of 
constitutional law as code.118 This means that competition among blockchains, 
which results in unique governance solutions, could be a valuable and informative 
precursor to the application of automated governance in the public sector. The terms 
of blockchain network participation and use that define entry and exit will become 
important margins of competition that shed light on the myriad institutional forms 
of digital citizenship and exit that are likely to emerge across the 21st century. Of 
course, it should be emphasized in conclusion that the benefits of this competition 
are only attainable if there is sufficient informed adoption of cryptocurrencies to 
where the competitive pressures described here yield efficiency-enhancing 
governance benefits. 
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